Chapter 5
Cross-Cultural Psychology in the 21st Century
David Matsumoto
San Francisco State University
If things continue as they have until now, cross-cultural psychology
as we know it today will cease to exist in the 21st century. Instead,
it will be integrated into mainstream psychology. Yet that integration
should not be a total assimilation of cross-cultural psychology
into mainstream psychology. There will be major accommodations
as well, fundamentally changing the essence of the way we model
and study human behavior. We are already witness to these changes,
as we are in the middle of an evolution in psychology.
In this chapter, I would like to
describe why I believe we are in the midst of this evolution.
I will first describe compelling issues that have driven cross-cultural
psychology until now. Then I will illustrate advances in knowledge
about human behavior by describing current knowledge in my field
of expertise, emotional expression and perception. I speculate
about the future of research in this area, and describe challenges
facing cross-cultural psychology as a whole for the next two decades.
I end this chapter by offering some friendly advice to those who
want to get into this exciting and wonderful area of psychology.
Compelling Research Issues in Cross-cultural Psychology
In the past, cross-cultural psychology was perceived as an "exotic"
branch of psychology for those with esoteric interests in culture.
Cross-cultural studies were generally viewed as an interesting
aberrant of more serious research in mainstream psychology and
were generally not assimilated into mainstream knowledge. Today,
however, cross-cultural psychology is viewed as a serious endeavor.
Studies reporting cultural differences are widespread and common
and make fundamental challenges to mainstream knowledge. Throughout
this history, a common thread ties much of this literature together,
and that is its overwhelming concern with uncovering universal
and culturally specific aspects of behavior.
Indeed, cross-cultural research has
uncovered many psychological processes that appear to be universal.
These include, for example, the perception and language of color;
processes of language acquisition; principles of cognition, thinking,
and learning; gender differences in mate selection and gender
stereotypes; and recognition and expression of facial expressions
of emotions. Not only do these findings provide important bases
by which we can find commonality with fellow humans, they also
allow us to speculate about their biological substrates, innateness,
and evolutionary and adaptive significance.
But cross-cultural research has also produced important cultural
differences. These occur in temperament, attachment, and child-rearing;
cognitive, moral, and socioemotional development; the structure
and function of language; rules for displaying and perceiving
emotions; psychopathology and physical health; and much more.
Collectively, they tell us that culture plays an important role
in shaping human experience and worldview as well.
Uncovering cultural similarities and differences in psychological
traits and behaviors is extremely important to the field for several
reasons. First, it helps us refine and revise our theoretical
understanding of human behavior. This activity is important if
we want to have theories in psychology that are applicable to
the widest audience possible. For example, cross-cultural research
has helped to refine our understanding of child-rearing practices
and attachment, modifying what the field considered to be optimal
attachment and child-rearing based on research conducted solely
in the U.S. to accommodate important differences in these practices
around the world. Second, uncovering cross-cultural differences
helps us deliver more effective psychologically-based services
to the public. These activities occur through psychotherapy, counseling,
business consulting, and the like, most of which are dependent
on accurate information and knowledge about people derived from
research. Cross-cultural research, for instance, has been instrumental
in helping to develop culturally sensitive methods of psychological
assessment and treatment, which is an important factor in psychotherapeutic
effectiveness. Third, cross-cultural research is important because
it provides important links and connections among people and psychologists
all around the world, helping to forge new ways of international
and intercultural cooperation among scholars and practitioners
alike. New organizations that cross many borders involve psychologists
and health-professionals, creating unions that would not be possible
otherwise.
Most current works in cross-cultural psychology document cultural
difference through cross-cultural comparison. While these studies
are found primarily in journals devoted to culture, such as the
Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, today they are found
in many mainstream journals as well. Moreover, if culture is defined
as a sociopsychological construct, as most writers do, then not
only are people of different races, ethnicities, and nationalities
members of different cultures; so are people of different genders,
sexual orientations, and abilities. If you take this entire literature
encompassing all these groups of people together as a whole, you
will notice that cross-cultural research is widespread and commonplace
in all areas of psycholog, and makes important contributions to
knowledge. Cross-cultural comparison has become a staple in the
academic diets of contemporary psychologists, and the existence
of cultural differences and the importance of culture to mold
our lives is now well accepted. This awareness is due, in part,
to the overwhelming amount of cross-cultural research that has
been conducted to date and the documentation of similarities and
differences, which has been the compelling issue in cross-cultural
psychology for years.
Cultural Influences on Emotional Expression and Perception
Cross-cultural research in my own field of study - emotional expression
and perception - exemplifies many of the developments and advances
in cross-cultural psychology over the past twenty or thirty years,
and I would like to review these developments here. I was first
interested in this field as an undergraduate at the University
of Michigan. For example, I wondered how infants, who did not
speak or understand totally language that was spoken around them,
could understand the emotional states of their mothers, fathers,
and other caretakers around them. Under the supervision of Robert
Zajonc, I designed a little study that tested the ability of young
children to judge accurately emotions portrayed in nonverbal vocal
cues. An opportunity followed that allowed me to conduct this
study cross-culturally. Once into graduate school, I continued
to delve into this area, immersing myself in the study of facial
expressions under the tutelage of Paul Ekman at the University
of California, San Francisco. Before I knew it, this area consumed
my research endeavors during graduate school and helped to launch
my career in this area.
As in other areas, comparisons demonstrating both cultural similarity
and difference have been extremely important in the area of emotional
expression and perception. Knowing about similarities and differences
in emotion across cultures helps us understand the possible innate,
biological substrates of emotion that are universal across all
peoples regardless of culture. It helps us to understand the role
of emotion in our lives and the importance of emotion to thinking
and behaving. Such comparisons help us to understand the role
of emotion and nonverbal behaviors in social interactions with
the goal of improving interactions among people from different
cultural backgrounds. And, this research helps us to consider
the common bases upon which humans develop, providing a backdrop
for mutual understanding and cooperation across cultures.
The last thirty years were witness to the "universality studies,"
which documented convincingly the universality of a set of six
facial expressions of emotion, including anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, and surprise. The emotions appear to be biologically
innate, appearing in non-human primates and congenitally blind
individuals (Charlesworth & Kreutzer, 1973; Ekman, 1973) and
correspond to similarities in emotion taxonomies in different
languages in the world (Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, &
Brazill, 1996; Romney, Moore, & Rusch, 1997). We also know,
however, that people modify their expressions on the basis of
cultural display rules (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1969;
Friesen, 1972). These are culturally prescribed rules, learned
early in life, that dictate the management and modification of
the universal expressions depending on social circumstance. After
the original universality studies in the late 1960s and early
1970s, many studies have replicated the universal recognition
of these expressions (see reviews in Ekman, 1982). Today their
universality, as well as the existence of display rules, are well
accepted in mainstream psychology (see also Fridlund's (1997)
view of display rules, which is different than that originally
postulated by Ekman and Friesen).
Recent research has extended the universality findings in important
ways. Some studies have shown more ways in which cultures are
similar, implicating consequences of expression universality.
Other studies have produced differences, extending our knowledge
about how cultures influence expression and perception. Collectively,
they give us further insights to the biological and environmental
processes that underlie facial expressions and emotion.
More Cultural Similarities in Emotional Expression
In contempt. In the last decade, a number of studies have
reported the existence of a seventh universal facial expression
of emotion: contempt. Initial evidence was collected from ten
cultures including West Sumatra (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman
& Heider, 1988). This finding was later replicated by Matsumoto
(1992b) in four cultures, three of which were different from Ekman
and Friesen's original ten. This finding received considerable
attention and criticism (Russell, 1991a, b; Izard & Haynes,
1988). Russell (1991a, b), for example, suggested that the context
in which the expression was shown influenced results in favor
of universality. In his study, the contempt expression was more
often labeled as either disgust or sadness when shown either alone
or after showing a disgust or sad picture (Russell, 1991). Ekman,
O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto (1991a, b), however, reanalyzed their
data to address this criticism and found no effect of context.
Biehl et al. (1997) also found no effects for other possible methodological
confounds.
In relative intensity. When comparing expressions, do people
of different cultures agree on which is more strongly expressed?
Cross-cultural research indicates that the answer to this question
is yes. Ekman et al. (1987) compared these differences in paired
expressions of the same emotion. Ninety-two percent of the time,
the ten cultures in their study agreed on which of two expressions
was more intense. Matsumoto and Ekman (1989) extended this finding
by including comparisons across different poser types, including
Caucasian and Japanese posers. Looking separately for each emotion,
within culture and across gender and then within gender across
culture, Americans and Japanese agreed on which photo was more
intense in 24 out of 30 comparisons. These findings suggest that
cultures judge emotions on a similar basis, despite differences
in facial physiognomy, morphology, race, and sex of the posers,
and culturally prescribed rules governing the expression and perception
of faces. These findings are important because they suggest that
people of different cultures use the same visual cues in judging
others.
In the association between perceived expression intensity and
interpretation. Do people of different cultures agree on their
assumptions about the relationship between expression and experience
when judging others? Matsumoto, Kasri, and Kooken (1999) showed
Japanese and American observers 56 expressions posed by Japanese
and Caucasians. The observers judged what emotion the poser was
expressing, and then the strength of both the external display
and internal experience. Correlations between the two intensity
ratings were conducted twice, first across observers separately
for each expression, and second across expressions for each observer.
Regardless of the computation, the correlations were high and
positive for both cultures and for all expressions. Observers
associated the strength of the external display with the presumed
strength of the experience of that display, suggesting commonality
in that linkage across culture. The link between the presence
or absence of an expression with the underlying experience, and
the intensity of both, is a topic of considerable importance in
contemporary theories of emotion. Some authors have claimed that
the linkage between expression and experience is unfounded (e.g.,
Russell, 1997; Fernandez-Dols, 1997). Others, however, have argued
that expressions and experience are intimately linked with each
other (but need not always be coupled) (Rosenberg & Ekman,
1994; see also the literature on the facial feedback hypothesis,
reviewed by Matsumoto, 1987; Winton, 1986). The data from Matsumoto
et al. (1997) clearly support notions of linkage.
In secondary emotional recognition. Do people of different
cultures agree on the secondary emotions portrayed in an expression?
Research findings suggest the answer to this question is yes.
Observers in Ekman et al.'s (1987) study judged not only which
emotion was portrayed in the faces, but also the intensity of
each of seven emotion categories. This task, therefore, allowed
observers to report multiple emotions, or no emotion, instead
of being forced to select an emotion to describe the face. While
previous studies showed universality in the first mode of response,
cultures may have differed in which emotion is next most prevalent.
Analyses, however, supported cultural agreement. For every culture
in Ekman et al.'s (1987) study, the secondary emotion for the
disgust expressions was contempt, and for fear expressions surprise.
For anger, the second mode varied depending on the photo, with
disgust, surprise and contempt as the second responses. These
findings were replicated by Matsumoto and Ekman (1989) and Biehl
et al. (1997), suggesting pancultural agreement in the multiple
meanings derived from universal faces. This agreement may exist
because of overlap in the semantics of the emotion categories,
antecedents and elicitors of emotion, or in the facial configurations
themselves.
In perceived expressivity. Do people of different cultures
have similar stereotypes about the expressivity of other cultures?
In one study (Pittam et al., 1995), Australian and Japanese subjects
completed a questionnaire regarding overall level of expressivity
of Australians and Japanese. Both Australian and Japanese subjects
rated the Japanese as less expressive than the Australians. These
findings indicated that people of different cultures believe that
there are differences in intensity of emotion expression, and
that they agree about who is more or less expressive.
More Cultural Differences
In emotion recognition. Are there ways in which cultures differ
in their judgments of emotion? Actually, although the original
universality research showed that subjects recognized emotions
at well over chance rates, no study ever reported perfect cross-cultural
agreement. Matsumoto (1992a), for example, compared Japanese and
American judgments, and found that recognition rates ranged from
64% to 99%, which were consistent with earlier universality studies.
Americans were better at recognizing anger, disgust, fear, and
sadness than the Japanese, but accuracy rates did not differ for
happiness or surprise.
Cultural differences in recognition rates do not necessarily suggest
non-universality, as has been suggested (Russell, 1994; see also
critiques of Russell's thesis by Ekman, 1994, and Izard, 1994),
and several studies have attempted to uncover possible explanations
for these differences. Matsumoto (1992a) suggested that the differences
in recognition rates are due to cultural differences in socially
learned rules about how emotions could be recognized. Specifically,
cultural differences between Japan and the US in the allowance
for individuality or conformity may have contributed to their
findings. In Japan, because of the emphasis on group harmony and
conformity, emotions that threaten these would be discouraged.
Therefore, a Japanese person would be careful to not show negative
emotions, and have a tendency to not recognize these expressions
in others. In contrast, the United States, a country that encourages
individuality, would encourage both the expression and perception
of negative emotions.
Elsewhere (Matsumoto, 1996), I have suggested a mechanism similar
to Ekman and Friesen's neurocultural theory of expression to describe
how cultural similarities and differences in emotion perception
or judgment can be obtained. This mechanism implies that judgments
of emotion are affected by (1) a Facial Affect Recognition Program
which is innate and universal (similar to Ekman and Friesen's
Facial Affect Program), and (2) culture specific decoding rules
that intensify, deintensify, mask, or qualify the perception (cf,
Buck, 1984). I believe that this mechanism is as basic to emotion
communication across cultures as Ekman and Friesen's original
neurocultural theory, and we will revisit this issue several times
below.
Cultural differences in emotion recognition rates are related
to stable and meaningful dimensions of cultural variability. Are
cultural differences in emotion judgments related to interpretable
dimensions of culture? To broaden the base of cultural dimensions
that could explain cultural differences in agreement levels, Matsumoto
(1989) selected recognition data from fifteen cultures reported
in four studies, and ranked each culture on Hofstede's dimensions
(1980). These included Power Distance (PD), the degree to which
differences in power are maintained by culture; Uncertainty Avoidance
(UA), the degree to which a culture develops institutions and
rituals to deal with the anxiety created by uncertainty; Individualism
(IN), the degree to which a culture encourages the sacrificing
of individual goals for the goals of the group; and Masculinity
(MA), the degree to which a culture emphasizes sex differences
(Hofstede, 1980, 1983). The dimensions were then correlated with
recognition accuracy levels. Individualism was positively correlated
with the recognition of happiness and negatively with sadness,
supporting the claim that Americans (individualistic culture)
are better at recognizing negative emotions than Japanese (collectivistic
culture).
Differences in emotion perception as a function of culture were
also found in a meta-analysis (Schimmack, 1996). Individualism
was a better predictor of recognition of happiness than ethnicity
(operationalized as Caucasian/non-Caucasian), supporting the notion
that sociocultural dimensions account for differences in the perception
of emotion. They also support the notion that people of different
cultures learn ways of perception management via cultural decoding
rules.
Biehl et al. (1997) also reported cross-national differences in
agreement (and in intensity ratings). These differences could
not be adequately explained according to a Western/non-Western
dichotomy, a division consistent with regional/country and racial/ethnic
approaches to operationalizing culture. Rather, Biehl et al. discussed
these differences in terms of possible underlying sociopsychological
variables (i.e. those postulated by Hofstede 1980, 1983) and the
dimensional approach to culture advanced by Matsumoto (1989, 1990).
Theoretical explanations and further testing of the relationship
between culture and recognition should define culture according
to meaningful sociopsychological dimensions above and beyond country,
region, race or ethnicity.
In attributions of intensity. Are cultures similar or different
in their judgments of the strength of an expression? Cross-cultural
research has documented cultural differences in the intensity
attributed to the facial expressions; Ekman et al.'s (1987) study
of ten cultures was the first to do so. Although overall recognition
data supported universality, Asians gave significantly lower intensity
ratings on happiness, surprise, and fear. These data suggested
that the judges were acting according to culturally learned rules
about how to perceive expressions, especially given the fact that
all posers were Caucasian. That is, it was possible that the Asians
rated the Caucasian posers less intensely out of politeness or
ignorance.
To examine this notion, Matsumoto and Ekman developed a stimulus
set comprised of Asian and Caucasian posers (Matsumoto & Ekman,
1988) and presented them to judges in the US and Japan (Matsumoto
& Ekman, 1989). For all but one emotion, Americans rated the
expressions more intensely than the Japanese, regardless of the
race of the person being judged. Because the differences were
not specific to the poser, Matsumoto and Ekman (1989) interpreted
the differences as a function of cultural decoding rules.
Matsumoto's (1989) study described earlier also investigated the
relationship between Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of culture and
emotion intensity ratings. Two important findings emerged. First,
there was a negative correlation between PD and intensity ratings
of anger, fear, and sadness, suggesting that cultures that emphasize
status differences rate these emotions less intensely. Secondly,
IN was positively correlated with intensity ratings of anger and
fear; individualistic cultures gave higher ratings. These results
suggest that understanding dimensions of culture could be the
key to explaining cultural differences in the perception of negative
emotions.
In inferences about emotional experiences underlying facial
expressions of emotion. Are people of different cultures similar
or different in how strongly they believe a person is actually
feeling an emotion when judging it in others? Although cultures
differed in their judgments of external display, it was unclear
as to whether cultures also differed in their inferences about
underlying experience, and if so, whether these differences were
similar to judgments of external display. Matsumoto, Kasri, and
Kooken (1999) tested this notion by comparing American and Japanese
judgments in which separate ratings were obtained for expression
intensity and subjective experience. Americans rated external
display more intensely than the Japanese, replicating previous
findings. The Japanese, however, rated internal experience more
intensely than the Americans. Within-culture analyses indicated
no significant differences between the two ratings for the Japanese.
Significant differences were found, however, for the Americans,
who consistently rated external display more intensely than subjective
experience. These findings were totally unexpected. Previously,
we suggested that American-Japanese differences occurred because
the Japanese suppressed their intensity ratings, as they do their
expressions. However, it was the Americans who exaggerated their
external display ratings relative to subjective experience, not
the Japanese who suppressed. Not only are such findings wake-up
calls to experienced cross-cultural researchers; they also force
us to consider how culture produces these tendencies, and why.
In recognition and intensity ratings
Are the cultural differences obtained in previous cross-cultural
research observable among different ethnic groups within the US?
Matsumoto (1993) conducted a study that addressed this question,
examining ethnic differences in affect intensity, emotion judgments,
display rule attitudes, and self-reported emotional expression
within the American culture. African-Americans perceived anger
more intensely than Asian-Americans, and disgust more intensely
than Caucasian- and Asian-Americans; Hispanic-Americans perceived
Caucasian faces more intensely than did Caucasian-and Asian-Americans;
and African-Americans perceived female expressions more intensely
than did Asian-Americans. These findings compel us to reevaluate
the way we conceptualize culture, and stress the importance of
psychologically meaningful dimensions of culture that are independent
of ethnicity or country. Most cross-cultural research assumes
that a person living in a country is a member of its primary culture.
Finding differences within an American sample (which is nearly
always the comparison group in cross-cultural studies) clearly
demonstrates otherwise and urges us to consider meaningful psychological
dimensions (e.g., individualism-collectivism, status differentiation)
to explain cultural and individual differences in emotion expression
and perception.
In attributions of personality based on smiles
Do people of different cultures make different judgments of personality
based on facial expressions? For example, the smile is a common
signal for greeting, acknowledgment, or for showing acceptance.
It is also employed to mask emotions, and cultures may differ
in the use of smiles for this purpose. This appeared to be the
case in Friesen's (1972) study in which Japanese and American
men watched disgusting video clips with an experimenter in the
room with them. The Japanese men used smiles to cover up their
negative expressions much more often than the American men (Ekman,
1972, Friesen, 1972).
To investigate further the meaning of those differences, Matsumoto
and Kudoh (1993) obtained ratings from Japanese and Americans
on smiling versus non-smiling (i.e., neutral) faces with regard
to intelligence, attractiveness, and sociability. Americans rated
smiling faces as more intelligent than neutral faces; the Japanese,
however, did not. Americans and Japanese both found smiling faces
more sociable than neutral faces, but for the Americans the difference
was to a greater degree. These differences suggest that cultural
display rules cause Japanese and Americans to attribute different
meanings to the smile, and serve as a good explanation for perceived
major differences in communication styles across cultures.
Speculations About Research on Culture and Emotion in the Next
15 Years
The next fifteen years will be exciting for research on culture
and emotion. Interesting programs have sprung up not only in this
country but around the world, and in all disciplines of psychology.
New technologies for mapping culture as a psychological construct
on the individual level are being developed, as well as ways to
measure precisely moment-to-moment changes in our brains and bodies
when we feel or judge emotion. All of these promise the most exciting
decade or two of research in the history of studies on culture
and emotion. Below, I review four areas that I believe research
on this topic will challenge. These are not only my guesses; they
are my hopes for where that research could and should go.
The Integration of Culture, Psychology, and Biology
New and interesting research on emotion is currently being conducted
on the physiological, cerebral, and neuroendocrinological correlates
of emotion processes. Although not directly related to culture
per se, they are exciting because of the possibility of branching
across the various sub-disciplines within emotion research to
integrate methods and concepts, producing studies that link culture
as a macro-social construct with underlying biological processes.
I outline three such examples below.
Culture and the physiology of emotion. In history, there
has been some controversy about the relationship between physiology
and emotion. Early writers (e.g., James, 1892) suggested that
recognition and awareness of our bodily reactions is what we then
label an emotion. Others suggested that some sort of physiological
arousal is necessary for emotion, but the exact labeling of the
emotion is dependent on the cues available to us in the environment
(e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962). Yet others have suggested
that no physiology at all is necessary for emotion (e.g., Mandler,
1984).
Despite these early controversies, new studies have shown that
our physiological reactions are indeed specific to each of the
emotions that are universal (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983).
These findings include responses of both the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) and the central nervous system (CNS). We do not know,
however, if these responses are universal. Research may uncover
how and why culture influences physiology, hopefully linking physiology
with culture as an individual-level as well as social-level construct,
specifying the exact dimension of culture that influences physiology
rather than relying on national or ethnic/racial methods of classifying
participants. Also, these studies will hopefully incorporate neuroendocrine
function, examining the universality of hormonal changes in relation
to emotion. Some studies have already paved the way for this research,
such as Scherer's work on self-reported physiological sensations
(Scherer, Wallbott, & Summerfield, 1983), and Levenson's (Tsai
& Levenson, 1997) work on Chinese v. European American participants.
The representation of cultural display rules in the brain.
Although the existence of cultural display rules is well accepted
in contemporary psychology, surprisingly little is known about
its exact nature, either psychologically or physiologically. As
technology that allows moment-to-moment measurement of brain activity
develops, we can examine how these rules are represented in the
brain. While certain brain areas are sure to store the verbal
rules of display semantically (e.g., big boys don't cry), it is
unclear as to how these propositions are accessed during an actual
emotion episode. My hunch is that there may be cross-cultural
commonality in the brain sites that store display rule propositions,
as well as sites in the limbic system that drive the biologically
innate functions of arousal and expression. But, I suspect that
there are cultural differences in how these areas are accessed
and the degree of intercommunication across areas. The ability
to test this hypothesis, however, requires that we are able to
map brain functioning and intra-brain communication among multiple
brain sites in less-than-a-second intervals, a technology currently
unavailable.
The representation of emotion perception in the brain.
We also have little knowledge about how universal and culture
specific aspects of emotion judgment are represented in the brain.
Some brain areas are specific to face recognition and processing,
but there is no research examining what areas of the brain are
activated when emotions are judged. That facial expressions of
emotion are universally recognized suggests that the brain areas
involved in recognition processes are pancultural. Specific brain
areas and intra-brain functioning, however, may be different for
different emotions and judgment processes (e.g., judgments of
display or experience intensity). Again, limitations in our ability
to measure brain activity make this line of research impossible
today, but a realization soon.
Culture, Context, and Emotion
One frontier facing emotion research concerns the effect of context
on experiencing, expressing, and perceiving emotions, and the
influence of culture on the relationship between context and emotion.
To be sure, much of the emphasis in the field in the last 30 years
was on the establishment of universality; research documenting
differences has only appeared in the last 10 or 15 years. As these
increase, they beg questions concerning the role of context in
shaping emotion, and the influence of culture in this process.
How does whom you are with, where you are, what is happening,
when and why it is occurring, affect your emotional experiences,
expressions, and judgments? If you are angry at your boss, does
that affect how you display your emotions when you are at work,
as opposed to when you are angry with your spouse? Do these parameters
of context have the same meaning for each of the different emotions?
And, do these context parameters have different effects, meanings,
and influence on the process of emotion in different cultures?
These are obviously important questions not only for theories
of emotion and culture in psychology, but also for practical and
applied purposes. Cross-cultural research, however, is yet to
systematically explore these important questions. Below I outline
two potential areas of study, of many, that challenge the field
in the next two decades.
Context effects on judgments of emotion. A number of studies
has examined the effect of context on emotion judgment, some manipulating
the context of the observer (e.g., Fernandez-Dols, Wallbott, &
Sanchez, 1991; Munn, 1940), others manipulating the context of
the poser (e.g., Carroll & Russell, 1996; Knudsen & Muzekari,
1983). While both areas are valid, studies of the latter are more
worthwhile to the field. To my knowledge, however, there has been
no study that has examined all the possible parameters of context
- the who, what, when, where, and why of emotion - and their effects
on elicitation, expression, or perception. Research needs to manipulate
experimentally all of these simultaneously in a factorial design
to investigate their effects on judgments. This research needs
to include expressions of varying type and intensity, and multiple
judgment options. What little research that exists in this area
to date falls sorely short of these ideals. These studies also
need to examine how the effects of context differ across cultures.
Such research will have important implications to our understanding
of intercultural communication and conflict.
Folk psychology and display rules. As mentioned above,
surprisingly little is known about the nature of display rules.
Display rules can be theoretically understood via folk psychology
- as a set of propositions and beliefs that are integrated to
produce behavioral outcomes. Culture supposedly supplies the propositions
and beliefs, and the nature of the integration. Future research
can focus on uncovering the nature of these propositions and beliefs,
and how the integration works. These propositions will need to
account for the variety of contexts within which emotion can occur.
Constructs distilled from these propositions in specific contexts
that are generalizable across contexts may be considered cultural
display rule values that guide our actions and behaviors. Much
work already exists in terms of the appraisal processes involved
in emotion arousal, and these need to be incorporated into folk
psychological research on display rules; they comprise much of
the semantic information necessary for action on the propositions
to occur. Folk psychological theories that account for cultural
display rules in one culture subsequently need to be studied across
cultures. My hunch is that there is pancultural similarity in
the structure of the semantic engine that drives display rules,
and in much of the processes in which this engine engages to act
upon propositions and beliefs to produce behaviors. Cultures will
probably differ, however, in the nature of the propositions and
beliefs.
Culture and the Social Significance of Emotion
Emotions have social as well as personal meaning, and we need
to know what role emotion plays in creating, maintaining, or destroying
interpersonal relationships, and how these processes are similar
or different across cultures. Kemper (1978) suggested that emotions
could be classified into two types - socially integrating emotions
and socially differentiating emotions, the former helping people
stay together, the latter breaking bonds among people. Kitayama,
Markus, and Matsumoto (1995) proposed a similar distinction, differentiating
between socially engaged and disengaged types, the former enhancing
interdependence with others, the latter enhancing independence
from others. Kitayama et al. (1995) demonstrated that such distinctions
can be useful in describing cultural differences in the emotional
lives of people of different cultural backgrounds. In their study,
people in the individualistic American culture experienced socially
disengaged emotions more frequently, while people of a more collectivistic
Japanese culture experienced socially engaged emotions more frequently.
Future research needs to explore these, and other, possible social
roles of emotion. While previous approaches, however, have classified
emotions into mutually exclusive dichotomies, I believe that emotions
are complex enough that they can serve both integrating and differentiating,
socially engaging as well as disengaging, roles depending on social
context. For example, sadness felt at the death of a loved one
may bond grieving parties together. Sadness that occurs because
of a moral transgression of a friend, however, may serve to drive
people apart. The same could be said of anger, happiness, and
all other emotions in our affective spectrum. If this is true,
future research must investigate not which emotions are integrating
and which are differentiating, but instead the parameters and
contexts that allow an emotion to be both integrating and differentiating,
and why. I speculate that there would be cross-cultural similarities
in the cultural rules regarding the social roles of emotion, but
that there would be cultural differences in exactly which emotions
played those roles. Cross-cultural research focusing entirely
on emotions as the unit of analysis may not be as fruitful as
focusing on the social functions they play.
Culture and Emotion in Interaction
As we learn more about the social and personal meanings of emotion,
we gain valuable information about the role of emotion in intercultural
and interpersonal communication episodes, and the influence of
culture on this process. Many writers (e.g., Bennett, 1993; Gudykunst,
Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996) have
suggested that emotion plays a key role in intercultural communication,
focusing especially on anxiety attendant to the uncertainty in
intercultural communication, and the fear, anger, and distress
that often occurs in intercultural misunderstandings. Nonverbal
aspects of communication far outweigh the verbal in communication,
and much of the nonverbal information is emotional. Indeed, successful
communication of emotions may be considered a necessary (and sometimes
sufficient?) ingredient to successful intercultural communication.
If true, future research on intercultural communication must focus
more on nonverbal emotions. In particular, the regulation of emotional
reactions to unintended gaffes may be a gateway to being able
to think critically about events and harboring the openness and
flexibility to accept rival hypotheses about the causes of these
offenses. The relationship between emotions, values, and reinforcement
of self also needs further exploration. I speculate that people
of different cultures are similar in the processes underlying
intercultural communication, but differ in the role of specific
emotions within the process.
Speculations About Research in Cross-cultural Psychology in
the Next 15 Years
Cultural differences challenge mainstream theoretical notions
about the nature of people and force us to rethink our basic theories
of personality, perception, cognition, emotion, development, social
psychology, and the like, in fundamental and profound ways. We
are on the verge of witnessing encyclopedic-type compendia of
cultural differences in almost all subfields of psychology with
ample evidence from many cultures of how truths of mainstream
Americans are not necessarily applicable to the rest of the world.
This overwhelming evidence brings with them an obligation for
us to make some sense of it all. The biggest challenge facing
cross-cultural psychology today and in the future is not in the
continued compilation of cultural differences in various facets
of psychology. Instead, it is in the development of theoretical
models and conceptual frameworks that can explain how cultures
are both similar and different, and why, and in the integration
of these frameworks into mainstream academic psychology. In short,
we need to stop and think about what it all means.
The Development of Theoretical Models To Explain Cultural Similarities
and Differences
Fortunately, a small but growing number of cross-cultural psychologists
has been interested in discovering how cultures come to create
similarities and differences and why. Many have turned their efforts
to studying the developmental processes underlying enculturation
- the process of learning the rules, values, attitudes, beliefs,
behaviors, and opinions of your first, original culture - and
have made important inroads to understanding how we acquire culture
and how it influences our lives (see reviews by Gardiner, Mutter,
& Kosmitzki, 1998; Matsumoto, 1999a). Another important inroad
concerns work on the relationship between culture and self-concept
as a mediator of psychological differences across cultures (see
Matsumoto, 1999b, for a review). A third avenue has been the use
of meaningful dimensions of cultural variability such as Individualism-collectivism
(IC) to predict and explain cultural similarities and differences
observed in research and observation.
In fact, much emphasis has been given recently to IC. Individualistic
cultures foster a unique sense of self and autonomy, clearly delineating
boundaries between oneself and others, encouraging the needs,
wishes, desires of individuals over group or collective concerns.
Collectivistic cultures, however, foster needs, wishes, and desires
of ingroups over those of individuals, valuing harmony, cooperation,
cohesion, and conformity.
IC has been used by many to predict and explain cultural differences
in a wide variety of psychological constructs (see review by Triandis,
1995). This construct is a major gain for cross-cultural research
and thinking because it allows authors to go beyond nationality,
race, or ethnicity in predicting and explaining differences, and
instead focuses on functional psychological predictions and interpretations
of data. Constructs like IC give researchers and theoreticians
alike a basis by which they can understand the psychological impact
of culture on both the macro-social as well as individual levels.
The study reviewed earlier linking cultural differences in judgments
of emotion with Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of cultural variability
is an example of such research (Matsumoto, 1989).
Recent advances in cross-cultural methods include the development
of ways to measure IC tendencies on the individual level. Triandis
(Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985) refers to these
tendencies as idiocentrism and allocentrism, and their measurement
is a major plus for research. They allow researchers to empirically
ascertain that their samples differ on this construct, providing
an important methodological check and eliminating reliance on
anecdotes, impressions, or stereotype when interpreting findings.
They also allow researchers to assess numerically the degree of
within-culture variability on this important construct. Using
this index, researchers can determine how much of the difference
between the groups are attributable to individual level differences
in IC.
Say, for example, that a researcher intends to compare two cultures
where all participants completed an individual level measurement
of IC. Group differences on the dependent variable could be tested
through normal procedures (e.g., t-test, ANOVA, chi-square, etc.).
In addition, the relationship between IC and the dependent variable
could be assessed through correlational procedures. If correlations
existed, their influence on the group differences obtained earlier
could be tested using multiple regression or analysis of covariance
(ANACOVA). The degree of contribution of IC to the group differences
could be computed by comparing effect sizes of the group between
the original and ANACOVA analyses.
There are many choices today as to the method of IC measurement.
The leading methods were developed by Triandis and his colleagues
(see appendix in Triandis, 1995, for review). Recent approaches
involve a multi-method approach assessing IC tendencies across
attitudes, values, opinions, and beliefs. Singelis, Triandis,
Bhawuk, and Gelfand (1995) have also developed measurement procedures
to assess horizontal and vertical IC. Hui (1988) developed a context-specific
method of measurement, while Yamaguchi (1994) has developed more
specific measures of collectivism. We have also developed a measure
of IC tendencies in specific contexts based on social interaction
(Matsumoto et al., 1997).
The field is embracing these measures in cross-cultural comparisons.
These developments are a major plus, as they relegate culture
to functional psychology, giving us a basis to understand how
and why similarities and differences occur. They allow for valuable
methodological checks in our research, and for statistical assessments
of the contribution of measured culture to observed differences.
The approach, therefore, is unique, promising, and innovative.
However, I do want to mention the importance of another cultural
dimension - power distance or status differentiation. The field
has been almost too preoccupied with IC to the exclusion of other
important dimensions. To be sure, no one dimension can capture
"culture" as we know it. Yet, how a culture deals with
power and status differences is just as important, if not more
so, than IC. Future endeavors should include the development of
individual level measures of this important cultural construct
as well, and integrate it into cross-cultural research.
The Integration of Cross-cultural Theories into Mainstream
Academic Psychology
Research on bilingualism has demonstrated that bilinguals seem
to access two cultural frames of references, depending on which
language they speak (see Matsumoto, 1999a for a review of this
literature). Bilinguals have reported different personalities,
judge emotions differently, appraise events and the environment
around them differently, and attribute the causes of events differently
depending on the language used when performing these tasks. Not
only do multiple cultural frameworks exist in their minds, but
bilinguals also have the added ability to monitor which cultural
framework they should engage in depending on the social context.
Thus, they have a meta-cognitive process that allows them to engage
with their "multiple personalities" in a healthy and
constructive way. This ability is related to the development of
intercultural sensitivity (e.g., see Bennett, 1993).
Most Americans are monolingual; yet, most of the rest of the world
is multilingual. This suggests that the information obtained from
research with Americans, and theories derived from Americans by
Americans, may be based on a theory of mind that is fundamentally
different than the rest of the world. We may not think twice about
whether those theories make sense to us or not, because they are
bounded within the same cultural framework as ourselves. It is
only when we look outside of ourselves when we can experience,
understand, and appreciate, those boundaries.
Mainstream psychology, therefore, has a lot of catching up to
do. The assimilation of cross-cultural findings and theories into
mainstream psychology suggests a fundamental revision in ways
of thinking of self and personality that have important consequences
for all areas of psychology. No information or ideas that we have
currently need to be thrown out. They just need to be placed within
the proper context to be understood and applicable for the most
appropriate people. Cross-cultural work needs to be assimilated
into mainstream psychology, and mainstream psychology needs to
accommodate to these ideas. The end product will be qualitatively
different than the psychology we are currently accustomed.
Where do we take up the challenge? The fight, if you will, is
not in the laboratory or field. It is, instead, in ourselves.
The greatest challenge facing cross-cultural psychology now is
to think less about producing finding after finding of cultural
differences, and to think more about ways of integrating them
collectively into a cohesive, comprehensive theory incorporating
mainstream as well as cross-cultural psychology. This is a challenge
also for all the subfields of psychology, which are splintered
fragments of a larger collective. While the need for specificity
and fragmentation is understandable, so is the need for integration
and synthesis. This requires that we look outside of psychology
to "put the pieces back together;" otherwise, we never
envision the whole, only parts of the whole. This integration
may require us to consult with anthropology, sociology, business,
medicine, and other disciplines. In developing theoretical models
to integrate cultural similarities and differences, we need to
go outside of psychology to know more about psychology. This new
approach need not be forced, nor need the revisions be horrendously
traumatic. Little steps will turn to big steps, and big steps
will be a journey. In the end, it is the walking, not the destination,
that is the desired end. Are cross-cultural psychologists up to
the task? Are psychologists up to the task?
Advice for Those Breaking Into this Field
I have four suggestions for people wanting to break into psychology
in general, and cross-cultural psychology in particular. Other
writers will have many other excellent advices for those crazy
enough to want to do so, but these are the kinds of things that
have helped me along in my career.
1. Get Grounded in Academic Psychology
Get a solid grounding in the methods of contemporary academic
psychology. Take as many classes on research methods and statistics
as you can. Challenge instructors of your content courses about
methods and statistics. Work in a research laboratory as an apprentice
with someone who is will to take you under his or her wing and
show you the ropes. Volunteer. Do a lot of research, make a lot
of mistakes, and take time to think a lot on the way. Polish your
skills at not only doing research, but learning how to think logically,
rationally, and critically. Learn how to use a computer and analyze
your own data. Be able to do everything in a study from start
to finish, and do it well.
2. Get Exposed to the Variety of Human Behavior
Get a lot of life experience. Have friends. Take time for love
and relationships. Work in a clinical setting. Experience people
with psychopathology. Experience the range of human emotions -
from the penultimate joys of accomplishment to the depths of anguish
and despair of loss. As a psychologist, understand people from
an emotional standpoint, not only from a cognitive/research standpoint.
You can't learn about the taste of strawberries by reading about
it in a book.
3. Get Experience in an Unfamiliar Culture
Travel, but not just as a tourist. Learn about the customs, ways,
and lifestyles of different people. Learn how they think, experience
emotions, and experience life. Learn another language, and get
to the point where you are fluent in it. Learn to accept, appreciate,
and respect cultural diversity. Become multicultural yourself.
It is an entirely different plane of being.
4. Put it all Together
Finally, put it all together. Take your life experiences seeing
the range of human behavior, your knowledge and appreciation of
culture, and the academic skills you have learned, and integrate
them into a meaningful career that teaches the rest of us something
that we don't already know. Make the world a better place. The
next frontier for psychology is the culture, and the next generation
of psychologists armed with these skills will be those who are
ready for that journey.
Good luck in that journey.
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| David Matsumoto is Professor of
Psychology and Director of the Culture and Emotion Research Laboratory
at San Francisco State University. He earned his B.A. from the
University of Michigan, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University
of California, Berkeley. He has studied emotion, human interaction,
and culture for over 15 years, and is a recognized expert in
this field. He is the author of approximately 250 works on culture
and emotion, including original research articles, paper presentations,
books, book chapters, videos, and assessment instruments. He
has made invited addresses to professional and scientific groups
in the U.S. and internationally. He also serves as an intercultural
consultant to various domestic and international businesses.
Dr. Matsumoto is also very active in the world of Olympic sport Judo, and brings his expertise in intercultural relations to this arena as well. In addition to being the Head Instructor of the East Bay Judo Institute in El Cerrito, CA, he also currently serves as the Development Chairman for the United States Judo Federation, and as an Official Researcher of the International Judo Federation. He has coached and managed senior and junior Judo teams representing the United States in international competition and training. Among these, he has been the Team Leader for the Judo team representing the United States at the 1995 World Championships in Chiba, Japan, the 1997 World Championships in Paris, France, the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, and the 1999 World Championships in Birmingham, England. He was also a Technical Official at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia. |
The author may be reached at dm@sfsu.edu |
